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Abstract
We analyze the relative merits of long-term versus repeated short-term auctions
in the allocation of access to a scarce infrastructural resource. Uncertainty about
future valuations creates for the infrastructure owner an option value of waiting,
and thus a beneﬁt from repeated short-term auctions, but long-term auctions can
avoid the costs of leaving infrastructure unutilized due to unattained reserve prices.
Short-term auctions turn out to be relatively attractive when there is uncertainty
about relative valuations of diﬀerent operators, due to shocks to idiosyncratic costs
or demand. Long-term auctions are better when shocks are mainly to common
demand or costs. In the presence of speciﬁc investments we show an additional
disincentive eﬀect of short-term auctions on investment. This can be partially oﬀset
by a competition eﬀect that makes ﬁrms invest more in order to increase their
chances in the future auction. We also consider what we call "lock-in" investment,
which does not change the value of outcomes but only their correlation over time. We
show that ﬁrms may invest for strategic reasons, as a way for committing themselves
to more aggressive bidding in a future auction. We discuss applications to railway
investment.
1Executive Summary
This paper examines how to allocate a scarce productive asset between rival users
under conditions of uncertainty. Speciﬁcally, there is uncertainty about which user can
make best use of the asset, which can be thought of as a section of railway track or a
similar piece of infrastructure. What gives this problem its particular character is that
the users have private information about the value of the asset to them, information that
becomes more precise over time. This creates an option value of waiting to make decision
about future allocations (so as to beneﬁtf r o mt h em o r ep r e c i s ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ef u t u r e ) ,
which must be set oﬀ against the cost of waiting, which can come from various sources.
The model is in two periods, so the choice is between making allocations one period at
a time or making the allocation for both periods at the beginning. However, the general
trade-oﬀ has a very general interpretation, highlighting the factors that tend to favour
longer-term contracts as opposed to shorter-term ones. We model the allocation process
as a type of auction, though we believe the broad principles would apply to a broader
range of allocation mechanisms, such as multilateral negotiation.
We begin by considering situations where the cost of waiting arises because short-term
contracts create a greater risk of leaving the asset unallocated. This is because reserve
prices are set at levels that trade-oﬀ revenue-raising considerations against eﬃciency crite-
ria; we show that under short-term contracts the temptation for revenue raising is higher
so the risks of ineﬃciency will be higher as well. We show that that the more future
uncertainty consists in common shocks to demand or to technology, the lower will be the
value of waiting to allocate future access and consequently the more desirable it will be
to use long-term auctions. If, however, future uncertainty is mostly about the relative
eﬃciency of rival operators, because shocks are principally to the idiosyncratic demand
or costs of individual ﬁrms, the more desirable it will be to use short-term auctions.
We then move on to consider situations in which waiting also imposes a cost in that
it discourages speciﬁc investment - namely investment that is only proﬁtable if the user
making it continues to have access to the asset. Once again, examples are common in the
ﬁeld of infrastructure - electricity plants built to connect to the grid, or trains built to run
along high-speed lines. As a rule, the more speciﬁc is the investment, the more it will be
desirable to have long-term auctions, which avoid the uncertainty in the mind of a winner
of a ﬁrst-period short-term auction about whether it will see a return on its investment.
However, this Uncertainty Eﬀect can be somewhat mitigated by a Competition Eﬀect,
under which the investment itself can be encouraged as a means to increase the probability
that a user winning the ﬁrst auction also wins the second. Though this Competition Eﬀect
can never completely outweigh the Uncertainty Eﬀect, we show conditions under which
it can signiﬁcantly dampen its eﬀect.
2In addition, we show that some kinds of speciﬁc investment are not necessarily to be
encouraged, since the very fact of competing for access to the asset may induce users to
invest for purely strategic motives, as a means of committing themselves to more aggressive
bidding in future auctions. We derive conditions for this to occur, and discuss applications
to infrastructure management, across a range of industries but with a particular focus on
railways.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider how to allocate the right to operate an asset (such as a piece of
rail infrastructure), or to provide services that make use of this asset, in the presence of
uncertainty about its value to alternative users1. The uncertainty has a dynamic character
- it is resolved over time. This creates an option value of waiting to allocate the right, to
diminish the risk of allocating it to the "wrong" user. However, this option value needs
to be traded oﬀ against the cost of waiting, which may come from various sources. If the
value of waiting is greater than the cost, it will be preferable to take decisions sequentially,
so that each decision takes into account the full up-to-date information available. If the
cost of waiting is greater than the beneﬁt, it will be preferable to take decisions for future
as well as current periods. This means that there will need to be a procedure for weighing
future choices against current ones. For instance, suppose the allocation procedure is an
auction. If participants in the auction are allowed to bid for rights in the future as well as
in the present, the rules of the auction must specify how to compare a bid for present and
future rights against another bid for purely present rights. It is not enough to allocate
rights to "the highest bidder" since in the absence of a ranking criterion we do not know
which bid is eﬀectively higher: 1.01 million dollars bid for two years of operating rights
may not be "higher" than 1 million bid for one year of rights.
We develop a model of the allocation procedure as an auction with two participants
who are bidding for monopoly operating rights to an infrastructure asset in two separate
periods. The model here is abstract enough to ﬁt several diﬀerent natural interpretations,
provided only that the asset is a scarce resource in the sense that granting operating rights
to one operator prevents (or reduces the value of) rights for the second operator. For
instance, it can represent the properties of negotiating mechanisms that are not auctions,
but share with auctions certain broad features such as the dependence of the price paid
by a successful participant on the willingness to pay of second highest bidder. Thus we
believe that it can capture features of many diﬀerent institutional forms of infrastructure
1We acknowledge with gratitude the advice and comments received from Guido Friebel, Marc Ivaldi,
Ralph Koerfgen, Markus Ksoll, Marko Niﬀka, Klaus Vestner and Christiane Warnecke. The opinions
expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone.
3allocation, such as the "framework contracts" introduced in the 2001 EU railway package
to allow for limited rights of railway track access to extend for longer than one scheduling
period. These do not allow monopoly access as such, but they do create value for operating
companies that extends over time, subject to a degree of uncertainty. The issues they
raise are similar to those in the present model. Similarly, the authority in charge of
allocating operating rights in our model may be interpreted as a commercial operator of
infrastructure, or a public authority tendering out services, or a regulatory body, though
t h ew e i g h tg i v e nt or e v e n u ei nt h a tb o d y ’ so b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o nm a yv a r yf r o mc a s et oc a s e .
In our model the allocating authority (hereafter just "the authority") must decide
whether to hold a repeated short-term auction, ﬁrst for one period and then for the
other, or a single long-term auction, in which bids for both periods are allowed. The
two periods need not be interpreted as of any particular length: the results of the model
can be interpreted instead as telling us what are the circumstances that would favour
a relatively longer term allocation as opposed to a relatively short-term one. As in any
auction there is asymmetric information in any one period between the authority and the
bidders about their private valuation in that period. But the twist here is that bidders also
know more than the authority about their valuations in future periods. Their information
is not complete, otherwise we could collapse the periods and treat them as one, but the
bidders nevertheless have information not available to the authority about their likely
future valuations.
We begin by considering just the option value of waiting, while the cost of waiting
comes just from the risk that valuations will be revealed to be low, thus lowering the
revenue that can be extracted from bidders. We go on subsequently to consider the
intertemporal trade-oﬀ due to the parties’ ability to make speciﬁc investments that aﬀect
their future valuations.
There is already a substantial literature on dynamic incentives and access to infrastruc-
ture, including the use of auction mechanisms. Laﬀont & Tirole (1993) remains the central
reference work in this area, and chapters 7 and 8 are the closest in spirit to this paper
(see also Laﬀont & Tirole (1987)). However, they are not very close, since the adverse
selection questions there arise in a static context, and the dynamic incentive problems
arise from the interaction of the one-time asymmetric information about agent types with
t h en e e dt og i v ei n c e n t i v e sf o re ﬀort so as to reduce costs over time. In particular there
is no analogue in their model of the option-value eﬀect in our paper. Similar consider-
ations apply to Meyer & Vickers (1997), which involves using comparisons between the
performance of diﬀerent agents to increase incentives for eﬀort. The value of long-term
contracts in the presence of speciﬁc investments has, of course, been recognized for a long
time, and indeed is a central point of the transactions cost literature going back to Coase
(1937) and revived by Williamson (1985) and, more formally by Grossman & Hart (1986)
4and Hart & Moore (1990) - see also Hart (1995) and for an empirical test in the context
of railways, Aﬀuso & Newbery (2003). For empirical studies looking speciﬁcally at the
application of auction mechanisms to infrastructure, see Janssen (2004). Similarly, the
notion that there is an option value of waiting to make a potentially irreversible alloca-
tion decision is of course not new (see Abel & Eberly, 1994 and Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).
However, we are not aware of other work exploring the interaction of speciﬁc investments
with an auction giving rise to such option values. Finally the idea of strategic investment
to deter entry goes back at least to Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) if not before (see Spence,
1977, for example). However, what is new here (as far as we are aware) is the idea that
strategic investment may act by increasing the informativeness of ﬁrms’ current signals
about future payoﬀs, thus encouraging them to bid more aggressively against each other.
We now turn to the basic model.
2 The Simple Model
2.1 Non-technical summary
• This model considers a revenue-maximizing authority (who may be a public author-
ity or a private ﬁrm), allocating access to a single infrastructure asset to one of two
ﬁrms, at two periods.
• The value to each of the ﬁrms of operating the infrastructure can take the value High
or Low. Each is equally likely, except that there are correlations between periods
and between ﬁrms.
• If one ﬁrm has a High value in any period, the probability that the other ﬁrm also
has a High value is given by a parameter that measures inter-ﬁrm correlation (the
same correlation holds for Low values).
• If a ﬁrm has a High value in the ﬁrst period, the probability that it has a High value
in the second period is given by a parameter that measures inter-period correlation.
• Each ﬁrm observes its own value for the current period before participating in the
auction.
• The authority faces a choice between a repeated short-term auction, in which access
is auctioned in each period for that period only, and a long-term auction, in which
ﬁrms can bid for access for both periods.
5• The revenue-maximizing short term auction will be a second-price auction with
a reserve price which may be equal to the High or the Low value (according to
circumstances we describe).
• If it is set to High, then with some probability the asset will remain unallocated,
since both ﬁrms will observe a Low value and will be unwilling to bid the reserve
price.
• The revenue-maximizing two-period auction will also be a second-period auction
with a reserve price (the formula for which we derive); if the reserve price is not
reached, the owner holds a short-term auction with a Low reserve price, followed by
a short-term auction with a High- reserve price in the second period.
• We compare the revenue raised under each type of auction and show that the com-
parison depends on the inter-ﬁrm and inter-period correlations in an inuitive way.
2.2 Formal description of the model
There are two ﬁrms, i =1 ,2,a n dt w op e r i o d s ,t =1 ,2.
vi
t is the value for ﬁrm i of operating the asset during period t.







.W e d e ﬁne σ = H−L
H , which we call the "variability index" of ﬁrms’
value, and note that (provided L is non-negative) its value must lie between zero and one.
There are, however, correlations in valuation across ﬁrms and across periods.
For example, ρ = corr(vi
1,v i
2) is the intra-ﬁrm correlation in valuations across periods.
This means we can write the probability that a given ﬁrm has the same valuation in each
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(1 + θ), (2)
6where θ = corr(v1
t,v 2
t) is the intra-period correlation in valuations across ﬁrms.













Table A1 in the appendix gives the probabilities of the 16 diﬀerent combinations of
high and low valuations for the two ﬁrms over the two periods.
For further reference, we denote by v(H) (resp. v(L)) the expected two-period proﬁt


















We now suppose that the authority faces a choice between a repeated short-term
auction, in which access is auctioned in each period for that period only, and a long-term
auction, in which ﬁrms can bid for access for both periods, but if there is no bid above the
reserve price, bids are accepted for the ﬁrst period only. We begin also by considering the
goal of the owner as consisting of simple revenue-maximization, before considering how
this relates to broader social welfare considerations.
2.3 Short-term auction
We solve ﬁrst for the revenue-maximizing short-term auction.
This will be a second price auction with reserve price p1 s e ta te i t h e rH or L.
If L is small then H is the revenue-maximizing reserve price, since with a reserve price
of L the revenue will be H only when both bidders have high valuations, instead of when
at least one of them does:








t = L)]. (3)















Under this condition, if the short-term auction is held twice in succession, expected
























for the short term auction repeated twice. The properties of the optimal short term
auction are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 1. When σ, the variability index of ﬁrms value is high and/or θ,t h e
degree of similarity between the two ﬁrms is low (speciﬁcally, σ>1+θ
3−θ) the optimal







,a n dap r o b a b i l i t y1
4(1+θ) that the asset is not operated at each period (1st
regime).
2. When on the contrary σ is low and/or θ is high, the asset is allocated with probability
one at each period, for a low price L. The expected revenue for the short term auction
repeated twice is then R2
ST =2 L (2nd regime).









1st regime p1 = H
2nd regime p2 = L
Figure 1: T h et w or e g i m e sf o rt h es h o r tt e r ma u c t i o n .
We now consider the alternative possibility of allocating the asset through a long-term
auction.
82.4 Long-term Auction
The revenue-maximizing long-term auction will also be a second price auction, but with
a two-period reserve price p2 that is lower than the expected two-period proﬁt v(H) of
aH - ﬁrm. This is because whenever there is no bid above p2 (i.e. if vi
1 = vi
2 = L), then
the authority will choose a repeated short-term auction, and oﬀer 1st period access2 for
a reserve price L, then 2nd period access for a reserve price H. The reserve price must
therefore be chosen so as to avoid giving a ﬁrm of type H the incentive to make a low bid
so as to inﬂuence the authority into oﬀering a repeated short-term auction. This reserve
price p2 is therefore equal to the expected total value v(H) for a ﬁrm of type H (as of date
1), minus the rent that such a ﬁrm would obtain from the repeated short-term auction.
This rent equals the diﬀerence in values (H − L) multiplied by the probability that the
other ﬁrm is L, conditional on oneself being H. W er u l eo u tt h el e s si n t e r e s t i n gc a s e
where the two-period reserve price is v(L) and the second period reserve price is L, due
to a low value of σ.
The allocation rule implemented by the long-term auction is summarized as follows:
• If (at t =1 )a tl e a s to n eﬁrm is H, the asset is allocated for two periods at a price
p2.
• If both ﬁrms are L at t =1 ,t h ea s s e ti sa l l o c a t e dt oo n eo ft h e ma tap r i c eL.A t
t =2 , a short term auction at reserve price p1 is organized. We focus on the case
where p1 = H (see footnote 2).
This yields












































2We rule out the less interesting case where ρ is so high that the optimal reserve price for 2nd period




1 = L] is close to 1. In this case, it can be shown that the
long term auction always gives a higher revenue to the auctioneer.
92.5 Comparing the auctions





























Thus a long-term auction will be preferable for the authority when the expected long-
term revenue exceeds the expected short-term revenue:















We show in Appendix 2 that this expression is increasing in θ and also in ρ,e x c e p t
when ρ is close to unity.
What are the general messages to draw from this? The advantages of each type of
auction can be summarized as follows:
• The beneﬁt of repeated short-term auctions should be understood as consisting of
the opportunity to optimize the allocation of the asset to the operator that can best
make proﬁtable use of it. The option value of waiting until later to allocate access
for the later period consists in the expected improvement in the eﬃciency of that
period’s allocation that comes about from choosing on the basis of more up-to-date
information. This will be unambiguously decreasing in θ, since the higher is θ the
lower is the probability that the two ﬁrms have diﬀerent values for track access in
the second period.
• The beneﬁt of a long-term auction consists of the revenue from being able to operate
the asset even when both users have low valuations in the ﬁrst period, while still
extracting any rent due to ρ, the high expectations of the ﬁrst-period auction winner,
when at least one user has a high valuation in the ﬁrst period.
In practice this means that the more future uncertainty consists in common shocks
to demand (this corresponds to an increase in θ) or to technology (this corresponds to
an increase in ρ) the lower will be the value of waiting to allocate future access and
consequently the more desirable it will be to use long-term auctions. If, however, future
10u n c e r t a i n t yi sm o s t l ya b o u tt h erelative eﬃciency of rival operators, because shocks are
principally to the idiosyncratic demand or costs of individual ﬁrms, the more desirable it
will be to use short-term auctions.
It is worth noting that the potential ineﬃciency of the repeated short-term auction
is artiﬁcial in that it comes about because of the revenue-maximizing objective of the
authority that leads it to set a high reserve price. By contrast, the potential ineﬃciency
of the long-term auction is intrinsic in that it comes about because at the time the decision
i sm a d et h e r ei sl e s si n f o r m a t i o nt h a nw o u l db ea v a i l a b l ei ft h ed e c i s i o no ns e c o n d - p e r i o d
access were delayed; this ineﬃciency would persist whatever the objective of the owner.
This suggests that the comparison between the two auctions might look diﬀerent if the
authority maximized social welfare instead of revenue. And so indeed it proves. If the
social welfare function were indiﬀerent between revenues of the authority and the service
operators, the optimal short-term auction would have a reserve price equal to L in both
periods, since this would ensure that the asset was still operated even when both operators
have observed L. In these circumstances the short-term auction would always be at least
as good for social welfare as the long-term auction, and often strictly better.
However, the revenue forgone under such a set-up would be large (the price paid by
the winner of the auction would be L instead of H whenever only one ﬁrm observed a
high value). Thus when revenues to the authority have higher weight in the social welfare
function than those to the operators (high enough to imply setting high reserve prices
in the short-term auction) the relevant comparison will still be given by the trade-oﬀ
described above.
Finally, it is worth explaining more fully the intuition behind the result that the short-
term auction tends to give a higher probability of leaving the asset unallocated. The reason
f o rt h i si st h a ti nal o n g - t e r ma u c t i o nﬁrms bid according to their expected future revenues.
In repeated short-term auctions they bid according to their actual revealed revenues (since
they observe the value of operating the asset before they bid in the auction). Since there
is higher variance in the ex post revealed outcomes than in their ex ante expected values,
and since the winners of the auction will be those who bid highest, the owner will set
higher reservation prices when bidders know their ex post values, being thereby able to
extract more rent from the winners. In a long-term auction, by contrast, the ﬁrms that
turn out after the event to have the highest values gain thereby a rent (if they are lucky
enough to have been the successful bidder) that it is too late for the owner to extract.
This means in turn that the two kinds of auction involve diﬀerent kinds of ineﬃciency -
the short-term auction risks leaving the asset unallocated because the reserve price is too
high, while the long-term auction risks leaving the asset allocated to the "wrong" user in
the second period.
11This result that an owner charges higher prices on the basis of ex post revealed val-
uations underlies a model of a quite diﬀerent phenomenon due to Kremer & Snyder
(2003), who argue that the reason pharmaceutical companies invest less in vaccines than
in curative drugs is that vaccines are purchased by those who only know their expected
probability of illness, while curative drugs are purchased by those who know their actual
state of health, and who therefore have a higher willingness to pay.
We now turn to consider speciﬁc investments, which complicate the inter-temporal
trade-oﬀ in interesting ways.
3 Extending the Model with Speciﬁc Investments
Speciﬁc investments have a return to the investor that is conditional on the continuation
of an economic relationship between the investor and some third party. In the present
context, a speciﬁc investment by a bidder would be one whose return was conditional on
the bidder’s having access to the infrastructure in the second period.
We begin by assuming that an investor who wins the auction for ﬁrst-period access can
choose to make an investment that will have a pay-oﬀ only if the investor continues to have
access in the second period. The question then arises what diﬀerence it makes whether
the investor knows that it will continue to have access in the second period (because it
has won a long-term auction), or must instead take part in a second short-term auction.
3.1 The Extended Model: non-technical summary
• The ﬁrm that wins the ﬁrst-period auction can choose to make an investment that
aﬀects the value of operating the asset only in the high-value state
• There is uncertainty about the value to the unsuccessful rival of operating the asset
in the second period
• The incentives for investment under a long-term auction depend on the correlation
between periods, since this will inﬂuence how conﬁdent a successful bidder can be
that demand will be high in the second period
• In comparison, a repeated short-term auction has two eﬀects on investment: one
negative (the uncertainty eﬀect, arising from not being sure that it will still be the
incumbent in the second period), and one positive (the competition eﬀect, arising
12from the fact that its investment may yield a return via the increased probability
of winning the second-period auction
• The competition eﬀect can signiﬁcantly oﬀset but cannot completely outweigh the
uncertainty eﬀect, so speciﬁc investment is always lower under a repeated short-term
auction
3.2 The Extended Model: formal description
Let I be the value of investment chosen by the ﬁrm that has won the ﬁrst-period auction
(to simplify matters we suppose that no investment takes place prior to the ﬁrst-period
auction). This investment has a cost C (I) which is increasing and strictly convex. The
investment aﬀects the value of using the asset in only the high state (generalizing this to
investment that aﬀects the value of the asset in both states is straightforward but adds
no particularly novel insight). Thus we can write that vi
2 ∈ {H (I),L},w h e r eH (I) is
increasing and weakly concave.
Let Hj, which is the value of access in the high state to the ﬁrm that has not won
the ﬁrst-period auction, be stochastic,3 and distributed uniformly on [H − ε,H + ε].T h i s
can be interpreted as the probability distribution for the possible technologies that may
be discovered, in the future, by some rival to the incumbent.
Then it is straightforward to write down the ﬁrst-order conditions for investment when
there is a long-term auction, since the ﬁrm that has won the auction is guaranteed to be
incumbent for the second period. Supposing that the ﬁrst-period auction has been won
by ﬁrm i,t h i sﬁrm chooses an investment I such that its marginal cost equals the product
of the probability of the high state at date 2 (conditional on the high state at date 1)
multiplied by the marginal beneﬁt H(I) derived from the investment in the high state.
Speciﬁcally:
C










When there is a repeated short-term auction the ﬁrst-order conditions are more com-
plex, since the ﬁrm that has won the auction faces a new auction in the second period.
It is not certain to win this auction (so it will receive the increased value of access with a
probability less than unity, thus diminishing its incentives to invest), but the investment
may also increase its probability of winning above what it would be without investment,
3The reason for making the values for the rival ﬁrm stochastic is to avoid the discontinuities in bidding
strategies that would arise if the incumbent ﬁrm knew that a tiny increase in its investment would enable
it to increase its probability of winning the second-period auction from zero to unity.
13thus giving it an additional incentive to invest that it would not have if access were
guaranteed.
On the assumption that the reserve price will be set above what the ﬁrm would bid if
it observed a low state, we can therefore write:
C























The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is analogous to the right-hand side of formula (8).
However, since the incumbent is not sure to win the auction, the probability that it can
beneﬁt from the investment is reduced: we call this the Uncertainty Eﬀect. Speciﬁcally,














T h ei m p a c to ft h eU n c e r t a i n t yE ﬀect of a repeated short-term auction is always to
discourage speciﬁc investment.
However the second term in formula (9) represents what we can call the Competition
Eﬀect. It consists of the eﬀect of investment on the probability that the incumbent ﬁrm
wins the auction, multiplied by the value of winning (the value to the incumbent if it
wins less the price it has to pay). It represents the additional inducement to speciﬁc
investment that comes from being in competition for second-period access. It will always
be positive, so the natural question that arises is whether it can be suﬃciently large to
o u t w e i g ht h en e g a t i v ei m p a c to ft h eU n c e r t a i n t yE ﬀect. The answer is that it cannot, but
it can come closer to doing so when the the investment makes a signiﬁcant diﬀerence to
the incumbent’s probability of winning the auction.



































Since Pr(H(I) >H j) ≤ 1, we see that the term between brackets is always less than
one. However, it is decreasing in θ and ρ and increasing in H(I). This means that, the
14more the speciﬁc investment increases the probability of an incumbent’s having a higher
valuation than a rival, the more nearly the competition eﬀect can compensate for the
uncertainty eﬀect. Nevertheless, the overall impact of a repeated short term auction is
always to reduce, even if only slightly, the speciﬁc investment compared to a long-term
auction.
3.3 Comparing auctions with speciﬁci n v e s t m e n t
The main eﬃciency costs of the two auction types can be characterized as follows:
• The cost of using long-term auctions is the risk that the winner will have a low value
in the second period (exactly as in the simple model), or that the rival would have
h a da ne v e nh i g h e rv a l u e .
• The cost of using short-term auctions is that, even though the incumbent may win
in the second period, it will do so with a lower value of investment than it would
have undertaken if it had known in advance that this would be the outcome.
The cost of the short-term auctions will be high if underinvestment signiﬁcantly low-
ers the value of access without signiﬁcantly increasing the probability of being displaced
by a rival. Alternatively expressed, short-term auctions are relatively attractive in cir-
cumstances where non-incumbents can with high probability mount credible challenges to
incumbents, but where incumbents can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence this probability by their in-
vestment decisions. We call investment that has this characteristic "rival-sensitive". The
opposite, namely rival-insensitive investment, is the kind which rivals cannot realistically
hope to match, so that although incumbents may be moved to undertake some of it by
the desire to outstrip its rival, it has no real motivation to achieve eﬃcient rather than
ineﬃcient levels of the investment.
What does this imply for the suitability of diﬀerent allocation mechanisms for the var-
ious characteristics of investments in infrastructure and its associated services? Consider
the four following types of investment:
• A) Relatively unspeciﬁc investment: such as investment in rolling stock or general
marketing
• B) Infrastructure-speciﬁc but not incumbent-speciﬁc investment: such as marketing
to develop routes and destinations, or investment in track
15• C) Incumbent-speciﬁc and rival-sensitive investment: such as spending on customer
relations, or minor improvements to non-transferable rolling-stock
• D) Incumbent-speciﬁc, but rival-insensitive investment: such as major improve-
ments to non-transferable rolling stock, investments designed to improve punctual-
ity and reliability of interlining (which a rival without a network presence could not
match), or major investments in maintenance operations
For investment types A) and C) there should be relatively little disincentive eﬀect of
short-term auctions, A because the uncertainty eﬀect is relatively weak and C) because
the competition eﬀect is relatively strong. Therefore, if there are good reasons to think
that diﬀerent operators are likely to have diﬀerent values in period 2, there is a good case
for using short-term auctions. For investment types B) and D), however, the disincentive
eﬀect of short-term auctions is potentially high (the uncertainty eﬀect is large and the
competition eﬀect is weak, for B) because investments spill over to the beneﬁto ft h er i v a l
as well as the incumbent, and for D) because the rival is no longer a credible challenger
once the incumbent has made a signiﬁcant degree of investment. In such circumstances,
therefore, to avoid discouraging investment it is desirable either to hold long-term auctions
or (if uncertainty about which operator will have the highest future value is suﬃciently
great), to design cost-sharing or leasing arrangements in which the authority bears a share
of the burden.
Overall, therefore, we have seen that in the presence of speciﬁc investments, a sequence
of short-term auctions has a tendency to discourage investment compared to a single long-
term auction. Thus the balance of advantage between short-and long-term auctions that
we discussed in section 2 will tend to shift against short-term auctions in circumstances
where speciﬁc investments are an important component of operating eﬃciency. However,
the disincentive for investmen due to short-ter auctions can be partly oﬀset by the strength
of the competition eﬀect. We have indicated some types in investment for which this is
relatively likely and others for which it is relatively unlikely.
We now turn to consider a kind of investment which may be encouraged by the presence
of auctions even though it has no impact on the value of outcomes - all it does is to
increase the correlation of outcomes in the future with those in the present. The value
of the investment to the operators nevertheless consists in the way it commits them to
bidding more aggressively in the auction in the future.
4" L o c k - i n " I n v e s t m e n t
16We consider next a type of speciﬁc investment that does not necessarily increase ﬁrms’
valuations in the second period; instead, it increases the correlation between ﬁrst- and
second-period valuations. For ﬁrms that experience high valuations in the ﬁrst period,
the investment increases their probability of high valuations in the second period, while
for ﬁr m se x p e r i e n c el o wﬁrst-period valuations it reduces their probability of high second-
period valuations. In other words, ﬁrms can invest to increase the value of ρ.W ec a l lt h i s
type of investment "lock-in" investment.
An example of lock-in investment would be investment in terminal facilities such as
passenger lounges. Another would be frequent-traveller programmes. When demand
conditions are good these increase the proﬁtability of operating a route. When demand
conditions are bad they lower the proﬁtability of operating a route, since they still incur
ﬁx e dc o s t so fo p e r a t i o ni na d d i t i o nt ot h es e t - u pc o s t s .
Why would any ﬁrm wish to make lock-in investments? There is one obvious reason
and one more subtle reason. The obvious reason is that ﬁrms that have already observed
their ﬁrst-period valuations have a reason to invest in increasing ρ if those valuations are
high. Conditional on a high valuation, increasing ρ just increases the probability of a high
outcome, and can be considered a speciﬁc investment of a standard kind.
The more subtle reason for investing to increase ρ applies even to a ﬁrm that has not
yet observed its ﬁrst-period valuation, and it applies in the context of a long-term auction.
This is that, the higher the value of ρ, the more aggressively the ﬁr mw i l lb i di nt h ee v e n t
that it observes a high valuation in the ﬁrst period (since this raises its expected gains
from second period access). Thus, investing in ρ m a yb eaw a yt oc o m m i t t i n gt h eﬁrm to
bid aggressively in the event that it observes a high valuation.
T os e et h i sw es h a l lm o d e lﬁrms as making investment decisions before they observe
their ﬁrst-period valuations. We call this "uninformed investment", and we show that
ﬁrms may nevertheless wish to invest for purely strategic reasons - committing them-
selves to bid more aggressively in case they subsequently observe high valuations. This
involves some wasteful duplication of costs by ﬁrms. In practice, of course, real invest-
ment decisions will combine informed and uninformed components. It is straightforward
to show that the results of our model generalize to this mixed setting4.
4.1 Lock-in investment: non-technical summary
• Firms choose investment levels before they have observed ﬁrst-period valuations, but
after they know what kind of auction mechanism will be implemented. Investment
4However, informed investment is negatively aﬀected by reserve prices (though uninformed investment
is unaﬀected by them). This suggests that, in a more general model, the setting of reserve prices should
take account the induced impact on investment, a problem we have not considered explicitly.
17increases the correlation between periods. By deﬁnition, therefore, such investment
has no expected social value as it is as likely to increase the probability of a bad as
of a good outcome in the second period
• In a short-term auction the returns are independent of the correlation between
periods, so if this method is chosen investment levels are zero
• In a long-term auction investments are increasing in the mean value of returns in
the high state, and also increasing in the degree of correlation between ﬁrms. This
means that ﬁrms are investing to commit themselves to more aggressive bidding,
which is a purely strategic motive and has no social value
4.2 Lock-in investment: formal description
L e tt h ev a l u eo fρi be chosen by each ﬁrm i.There is a cost c(ρi) which is increasing
convex.
The order of events is as follows:
Period −1: authority chooses an auction method
(short- or long-term) and the reserve prices
Period 0:e a c h ﬁrm chooses ρi
Period 1: ﬁrms observe vi
1 and bid in the auction.
Firms therefore choose ρi before observing vi
1.
However, they observe vi
1 before bidding in the auction.


































where Ei(1) = is the event that i is the only bidder in period 2,a n dEi(2) is the event
that i wins a 2-bid auction in period 2
In the short-term auction the expressions Pr[Ei(1)] and Pr[Ei(2)] are independent of
ρi.
This is because the unconditional probability that vi
2 = Hi is independent of ρi,a n d
bids by ﬁrm i a r em a d ei nt h ek n o w l e d g eo fvi
2 so are likewise independent of ρi.
The expressions E (Hi − Hj | Ei(2)) and (Hi − HR | Ei(1)) are likewise independent
of ρi.
18Therefore ρi =0 .

















































































(1 + ρi)H − (1 + ρj)(H − ε)





At a symmetric solution with ρi = ρj = ρ∗ this yields c0(ρ∗)=
(1+θ)H
6(1+ρ∗) which gives ρ∗
increasing in H and θ and independent of ε.
What these results highlight is that speciﬁc investment is not always socially valuable
- indeed here by assumption it has no value since it increases the persistence of good and
bad valuations alike. Nevertheless, uncertainty about future outcomes may make ﬁrms
willing to bid more aggressively in the ﬁrst period of a long-term auction in order to gain
beneﬁts in the second period.
5 Applications
What do these results mean in practice for policy towards infrastructure industries? Con-
ditions vary widely between industries, and among diﬀerent activities within any given
industry, so it is unlikely that a "one size ﬁts all" policy is appropriate. The following
are some illustrative remarks about ways in which the insights of these ﬁndings might be
used to suggest adapting allocation mechanisms to the diﬀerent conditions between and
within industries, though we stress that any such conclusions remain tentative:
• The inﬂuence of the contract regime on speciﬁc investments highlights the fact that
longer-term contracts are more suitable for, say, railways and telecommunications
than, say, bus transport services and air transport services, which use capital that is
19relatively easily transferable from one location to another, including across national
boundaries.
• Authorities that insist on very detailed service speciﬁcations in tender contracts,
rather than allowing service operators to optimise in the light of their experience
and the information available, risk making investment more speciﬁc than it need or
should be. This not only discourages investment but is likely to reduce the amounts
that ﬁrms are willing to pay for access to the asset.
• Anti-incumbent biases, sometimes motivated by the idea that competition is work-
ing eﬀectively only if new entrants are systematically taking market share from
incumbents, can do a lot of damage to the incentives for investment (including for
investments by new entrants once they in turn become incumbents).The ability of
the Competition eﬀect signiﬁcantly to oﬀset the Uncertainty eﬀect implies that al-
location rules need to ensure that incumbent ﬁrms can have a realistic chance of
retaining access to infrastructure if they make signiﬁcant investments5.
• Not all speciﬁc investment is socially productive, and some (such as customer loyalty
programmes) may be privately proﬁtable chieﬂy through committing ﬁrms to bid
more aggressively against each other. While more aggressive bidding is not to be
deplored per se, spending signiﬁcant resources principally for this purpose is indeed
wasteful. This is not to say that the authorities should actively seek to discourage
such investment, merely that they should not make eﬀorts to encourage it by making
contracts longer than they would otherwise be.
• T h ei m p o r t a n c eo fu n c e r t a i n t ya b o u ti n d ustry-wide conditions (about demand or
technology) varies considerably from one sector to another, and even from one ac-
tivity to another within a given sector. In telecoms, for example, uncertainty over
future demand for services, and over the evolution of technology, probably dwarfs
uncertainty over which ﬁrm will be best able proﬁt a b l yt oo p e r a t eag i v e ni n f r a s t r u c -
tural asset such as an interval of radio spectrum. In contrast, railways are a sector
in which there is less uncertainty about industry-wide conditions and considerably
more uncertainty about the relative eﬃciency of diﬀerent service operators. This
suggests that short-term contracts are likely to be relatively more desirable in (at
least some parts of) the railway industry than in telecoms. Extreme short-term con-
tracts (less than a year) are sometimes associated with "open access" arrangements,
and it is not surprising therefore that we see them being encouraged in (some kinds
of) railway service. However, open access as such implies that several operators
5Aﬀuso & Newbery (2002) argue that this motivation is an important reason why shorter contracts
in the UK railway industry did not appear to discourage speciﬁc investment.
20may have rights to use closely substitutable units of infrastructure, and does not
intrinsically imply that the contracts under which they do so must be short term.
6 Conclusions
This paper has modelled the factors that inﬂuence the trade-oﬀ between short-term and
long-term auctions for the allocation of infrastructure. We can now draw the results
together and discuss what they mean for diﬀerent kinds of allocation procedure in a
particular sector such as railways.
Repeated short-term auction auctions are likely to prove relatively desirable when
• there is high uncertainty about the relative eﬃciency of rival operators, because
shocks are principally to the idiosyncratic demand or costs of individual ﬁrms
• most investment by the operators is not speciﬁc to the routes (or kinds of routes)
operated
• investment that is route-speciﬁc has a large impact on the value to an incumbent
operator of obtaining future infrastructure access, and therefore on its likelihood of
outbidding a future rival that has not made such investment
• speciﬁc investments are undertaken more out of strategic motives (and may involve
wasteful cost duplication) than because they are intrinsically productive
Long-term auctions are likely to prove relatively desirable when
• there is more uncertainty about absolute than about relative valuations, since shocks
are principally to the common costs or demand of all ﬁrms in the industry
• there is signiﬁcant route-speciﬁc investment, which nevertheless leaves a large mar-
gin of uncertainty as to an incumbent’s chances of outbidding a future rival, perhaps
because some of the value of the investment spills over to rivals
• speciﬁc investment is socially valuable (by increasing the value of operating the
asset) rather than just strategically valuable (by committing the ﬁrm to more ag-
gressive future bidding)
21Diﬀerent parts of the railway infrastructure will be diﬀerently suited to these two kinds
of method: high-speed train operations, for instance, require more speciﬁc investment,
some of which may spill over to rivals, so that the case for long-term auctions is stronger
for other types of operation, such as in regional transport. On the other hand, routes on
which there is an important degree of interlining between the services of diﬀerent operators
(as may be true in some parts of the regional network) are ones in which the beneﬁts of
some speciﬁc investments may spill over to rival operators, and in which therefore long-
term contracts may be important to avoid disincentives.
The extent to which investment is speciﬁc is not always simply given by the technology,
but can be aﬀected by the actions of the regulatory authorities. For instance, detailed
speciﬁcation of rolling stock characteristics by the authorities in tendering contracts may
increase the speciﬁcity of the required investment and require longer contract periods in
order to avoid adverse incentive eﬀects. Similar consequences may arise from regulatory
enforcement of interlining between operators, since this will increase the extent to which
investments by one ﬁrm can spill over to rivals. On the other hand, harmonization of
technical standards (within the EU, for instance), may have indirect as well as direct
beneﬁts through making it possible to grant shorter contracts to operators because their
investments are less speciﬁc.
All of these factors aﬀecting investment speciﬁcity can evolve over time: technological
sophistication (of high-speed trains, for instance) is probably making investments more
speciﬁc on average, but regulatory convergence is probably making them less speciﬁc.
Further research, empirical as well as theoretical, will be needed to see to what extent
performance outcomes (eﬃciency of operation, levels of investment and so on) are sensitive
in practice to the length and nature of asset allocation mechanisms. Once this is done
it should be possible to develop rules of thumb for selection allocation mechanisms for
diﬀerent kinds of infrastructure access.
22Appendix 1: The Probability Table
\ t =2
t =1 \ H, H H, L L, H L, L
H, H
(1 + θ)(1 + ρ)2
16
(1 + θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
(1 + θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
(1 + θ)(1 − ρ)2
16
H, L
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
(1 − θ)(1 + ρ)2
16
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ)2
16
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
L, H
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ)2
16
(1 − θ)(1 + ρ)2
16
(1 − θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
L, L
(1 + θ)(1 − ρ)2
16
(1 + θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
(1 + θ)(1 − ρ2)
16
(1 + θ)(1 + ρ)2
16
This table gives the probabilities of the 16 possible conﬁgurations of our model over




4 (1 + θ). Similarly the sum of the 4 probabilities
in the northwest square equals Pr(vi
1 = vi
2 = H)=1
4 (1 + ρ), and analogously for the
southeast square. This table allows for the computation of the probabilities used in the
text.
Appendix 2 The properties of σLT
Recall the expression of σLT:
σLT(ρ,θ)=
(1 + θ)[8 − (1 + ρ)2]









3 − ρ − 2θ




∂θ has the same sign as
P(ρ,θ) ≡ 8 − (3 − θ)(ρ + θ)+( 1+θ)(3 − ρ − 2θ)
=8 − 3ρ − 3θ + θρ+ θ
2 +3+3 θ − ρ − ρθ − 2θ − 2θ
2.
After simpliﬁc a t i o n sw eo b t a i n :
P(ρ,θ)=1 1− 2θ − 4ρ − θ
2,
23which is non negative for all (ρ,θ) ∈ [−1,1]2.








8 − (1 + ρ)2 +
3 − θ




∂ρ has the same sign as
Q(ρ,θ) ≡ [8 − (1 + ρ)
2](3 − θ) − 2(1 + ρ)[8 − (3 − θ)(ρ + θ)],
which after simpliﬁcations gives:
Q(ρ,θ)=( 3− θ)ρ
2 +2 ρ(3θ − θ
2 − 8) + (5 − θ − 2θ
2).
When ρ =1 ,t h i si sn e g a t i v e
Q(1,θ)=−4θ
2 +4 θ − 8.
However for ρ positive or close to zero this is positive for θ ∈ [−1,1]
Q(0,θ)=−2θ
2 +5≥ 2( for θ ≤ 1)
∂Q
∂ρ
(ρ,θ)=2 ρ(3 − θ) − 2[θ
2 − 3θ +8 ]
< 2[3 − θ − θ
2 +3 θ − 8] = 2[−θ
2 +2 θ − 5] < 0.
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